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FILED 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH JUL 2 81982 
----00000---- --·············-························ 
Clerk, Sup<-• Court, Utftl 
il Billings, et al•, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
V• 
tanley T. Farley, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
NO. 17336 
C()IE NOW DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS CARN L. BAUM AND PEGGY BAUM, PRO SE, AND 
tition the Court for a rehearing in the above-captioned matter and allege 
that the Court erred in its June 24, 1982 Decision, in these ways: 
£Qlt:!l..l. Plaintiffs have burden to prove existence and terms of contract; 
no proof was adduced. 
POINT 2. Utah State law precludes enforcement of plaintiffs' alleged 
ral contract. 
POINT 3. Evidence did not establish the price at which Muir-Roberts 
sold its cherries. 
POINT 4. Letter of July 10, 1973 was to give the growers an idea of 
iflat the grower price would be 10 days from then when defendants would begin 
purchasing their cherries. 
POINT 5, What defendants' profits were from 1973 cherry operation. 
POINT 6. Evidence did not establish Muir-Roberts' price was 2lt cents. 
POINT 7. Evidence did not show Muir-Roberts' price was the fair market 
POINT 8. Evidence did not show price free~e was lifted July 18, 1973. 
.EQ.INT 9. Com12~aint must fail; no evidence was presented to prove the 
al.legations therein. 
More on the context of the case 
price. 
L Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendants Garn L. and Peggy Baum believe the Court did not thoroughly 
understand certain aspects of the case, thus erred unknowingly. These deier::· 
ants in their accompanying brief have intended to elucidate those areas tr.e; 
believe were mis cons trued by the Court. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 76 11 
Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants have cited authorities relied upon to 
sustain the points, where applicable, listed in this petition. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of July 1982. 
I 
l! 
this Petition for Rehearin~ ~ MAILING CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of 
to plaintiffs' attorneys Dallas H. Young, Jr. and Dave MQ\i\ullin at their addn:1 
Ivie and Young, 48 North University Avenue, Provo, Utah 84601, and hand-deJivii 
two copies to Robert N. Macri, attorney for Appellants Farley, at 738 South 
600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, on this 28th day of July 1982. 
2. 
I 
-
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
As late as December 1974 plaintiffs filed a Complaint against defendants--
a cherry processor and cash buyer of fresh sour cherries, alleging that defen-
dants who had purchased plaintiffs' 1973 cherries at 15 cents per pound and 
~id for them November 1973 owed them more money because cormnission merchant-
and-consignment buyer Muir-Roberts in March 1974 settled at 20 cents with those 
:plaintiffs who during the same season in which they sold cherries to the defen-
dants also consigned some to Muir-Roberts, and further alleged that the defen-
dants agreed and contracted with the plaintiffs to pay them what was being paid 
by the other processors in the area; defendants responded declaring they pur-
~ased the fruit at a firm quoted price of 15 cents and had not agreed or contract-
~ with the plaintiffs at any other price. 
ooOoo 
QISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On March 31, 1980 Judge George E. Ballif, of the Fourth Judicial District 
~urt, ordered, adjudged and decreed that judgment be entered against Garn L. 
laum and Peggy Baum and Stanley T. Farley in favor of the plaintiffs; addition-
Illy, judgment was entered in favor of cross-claimant Stanley T. Farley and 
Jqainst Garn L. and Peggy Baum. After a hearing on September 12, 1980, Judge 
lallif denied defendants• r,1otions to amend and for a ne\'1 trial, filed because of 
~vily discovered evidence which would make apparent -che fact that plaintiff 
·~ 
, hn Gillman--the very man who initiated the poisoning of minds which brought 
'liout the lawsuit--clearly knew the price at which the defendants were purchasing 
-~e cherries was 15 cents. 
ooOoo 
1. 
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RELIEF SOUQH ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Appellants seek a reversal of the Decree entered by Judge 
Ballif, as the Decree is entirely unjustified in the absence of a written 
contract for a price better than 15 cents. 
ooOoo 
STATEMENT OF FACIS 
The remaining plaintiffs who received judgments in this case are frui: 
growers in Utah County. Defendant-Appellant Garn L. Baum operated a fruit 
processing plant in Provo, Utah in 1973, and had, since 1952. During ~1e 
time between 1952 and 1973 many of the plaintiffs as well as other growers 
had sold their sour cherries to Garn L. Baum. 
In 1973 defendant Baum was experiencing financial difficulties due to 
a hail storm in 1969, marketing problems in 1971, and an unseasonably cold· 
weather state-wide free.ze-out in the spring of 1972 which caused Utah to be 
declared a disaster area. Because defendant Baum sought government help tna 
might be available through the Department of Agriculture, John Gillman·· 
deceased fruit grower in Utah County and the Director of Consumer and Market 
Services in the Dept. of Agriculture--learned of Baum' s financial plight. 
When the Bank of American Fork foreclosed on Baum' s property, includin~ 
the processing plant, the plaintiffs Harley Gillman, Merrill Gappmayer and 
Gillman Brothers--John in the Dept. of Agriculture, Dean and Glade--attempt~ 
· d · d t t · lize becau~ a take-over of Baum's plant and property, but it " J. no ma eria 
Stanley Farley came to the assistance of Baums and their property was saJva~ 
for the 1973 season." (Record at 233, par. 3) 
The growers were interested in 1973 
purposes of 1. maintaining a competitive 
2. 
f 1 in patronizing defendant Baum or 
atmosphere in the fruit processing 
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Miness, 2. to help Baum out, and 3. to have a home for their fruit when the 
plant of another processor--Muir-Roberts--was plugged up with an oversupply of 
ci:erries, (Record at 561, lines 10-26; at 477, lines 9-11; at 123, lines 12-15; 
at 93, answer to No. 6; at 102, question No. 6 and answer) since there was a 
tremendous crop of cherries that year and a real concern that "there was not 
~nough equipment in the state of Utah to handle the volume of cherries to be 
~rocessed." (Record at 461, lines 14-30; at 123, lines 8-11) 
A price freeze imposed by P!-esident Nixon on June 13, 1973 which placed a 
ceiling on commodities across the country was in effect on July 10, 1973, and 
~n that July 10th defendant Garn L. Baum sent a letter to growers of cherries 
~etting them know that through the help of his sister Ora Farley and brother-in-
iaw Stanley T. Farley the Baum processing plant would be operating that year and 
!that he defendant Baum expected the price at which they would be purchasing the 
50ur cherries from the growers in about 10 days to be at 15 cents unless the 
price freeze was lifted by then. 
Defendant Baum had a competitor in Utah Valley which processed sour cherries 
by the name of Muir-Roberts. Muir-Roberts was a licensed commission merchant 
(5·1·2 (e) Utah Code Annotated). Defendant Baum was licensed as a "dealer" 
(5·1·2 (g) Utah Code Annotated). Defendant Baum also had a competitor by the 
name of Banquet Foods--formerly Western Pack--in the Brigham City area. M"ir-
Roberts was also a competitor of Baum in that area. Baum had purchased sour 
cherries in the Brigham City airea during other cherry seasons, but by the time 
he received the help from Stan Farley in 1973 most of the growers there were 
already committed to either Muir-Roberts or Banquet Foods; thus Baum only made 
purchases totaling 17 ,608 pounds from 8 growers there that year, then bought no 
more since the amount of cherries he was getting didn't justify the haul. 
3. 
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Another of Baum' s competitors was fruit grower-processor Dave Mct.'iUll' 1r.1 
attorney for the plaintiffs in this lawsuit, whose cherry processing plant:: 
located in Genola, near Payson, Utah. Dave McMullin, whose plant rarely ac<: 
ted cherries from the public, was mostly a competitor of Baum's in the~ 
market--the potential buyers for Baum' s an,Q. McMullin' s processed cherries:,<, 
the same buyers. 
Commencing on July 20, 1973 defendant Baum bought cherries at 15 cents:, 
pound (Record at 475, lines 28 to line 5 at 476) from the plaintiffs and at 
least another ll5 growers (Record at 477, lines 18-19), processed the cheni! 
and had them sold during July 1973. During the same harvest time, growers·· 
including some of the plaintiffs--consigned cherries to competitor Muir-Rott:. 
cherries which Muir-Roberts processed then held for sale, as its license per.I 
until after the price freeze had been lifted. The price freeze was lifted 
September 12, 1973. 
In November 1973 defendant Baum paid the growers and plaintiffs the 15 I 
cent purchase price for their cherries. On March 22, 1974 Muir-Roberts set:i~ 
with its growers at about 5 cents per pound more on a comparable grade. (Pl!.! 
tiffs' Exhibit No. 15) 
When Baum applied for his 1974 license, John Gillman, officer in the D~t 
of Agriculture, received Baum's financial statement. 
Sometime between March 22, 1974 and late July or August 1974, plaintiii 1 
Harley Gillman, a cousin to John, Dean and Glade Gillman, typed a letter td 
Baums which was to be an attempt to make them pay more for the cherries def~· 
h . 1 t never sent to the Baums beCI'~ dants bought in 1973. However, t is e ter was 
I 
Dave McMullin had told the Gillmans they needed to find one person who hea!O 
5 .. 1 
Baums quote more than 15 cents. (Record at 186, lines 25-30 and to line ' 
4. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Glade and Harley Gillman, being the prime movers, and other plaintiffs 
elicited growers to join in a lawsuit, this one, against the defendants. 
lecord at 114, questions 10, ll and 12 and answers; at 125, question 11 and 
isi·.~r; at 86, questions ll and 12 and answers; at 95, questions 11 and 12 and 
In December 1974, almost a year and a half after defendants purchased 
1e plaintiffs' cherries, this lawsuit was filed seeking 5 cents per pound 
ire for their cherries, claiming the other processors paid 20 cents. (Record 
:2) It named 16 plaintiffs. M~ny of the plaintiffs listed had not given 
1thority to the attorneys--Dave McMullin and Dallas Young, Jr.--to put them 
1 the lawsuit, and one by one as the various plaintiffs learned they were 
~ties to it, had their names removed: Percy Adams did; so did C.A. Robert-
•n and Stan Adams as well as Robert Olsen and Dean Peck; and the L.D.S. Church-
ned Elberta Fann Corporation vehemently stated it was not a party to the suit, 
ver had been, that it had never authori:z;ed the act of being named in the matter, 
dmoved the Court to have its name stricken. (Record at 177, also at 37, 38, 
, 42 and 43) 
At the trial, only 6 of the original 16-named plaintiffs remained. Of 
ese 6, three are defendants and one a co-conspirator in a federal anti-trust 
it presently on appeal in Denver, which alleges that these people ac-~.Jd in 
elation of the U.S. anti-trust laws and conspired to drive the Baums out of 
siness. (Record at 67, lines 23-29) 
The Complaint alleged that the defendants were a commission merchant 
iis is referring to this case, here, Billings v. Farley); since then the 
rendants · · h t" proved that they were a "dealer" and IlQ1 a "commission mere an • 
1 their duties are not the same. 
5. 
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ARGUMBH 
POINT 1 
Plaintiffs have burden to prove existence and terms of contract; no prooi 
was adduced. 
In suit on a contract, plaintiff has the burden to prove the existence 
and terms of the contract--Madrid v. Norton, 596 P.2d llOB. i'/yo. 1979. 
Plaintiffs presented testimony that Garn L. Baum had conversations wi~. 
the plaintiffs Merrill Gappmayer, Paul Hansen and Dean Gillman, a partner oi 
Gillman Brothers, and promised them that Fantasy Fruits would pay as much 
for cherries as a competing processor, Muir-Roberts, was paying. However, 
plaintiffs did not present one shred of evidence to prove that Garn L. Ba11111 
made any such promise. They did not have ~ witness to bear out the test~ 
of any or all of the three. Furthermore, Garn L. Baum denied making such i 
promise and testified that he purchased the cherries at 15 cents. (Record a: 
531, line 1 and at 552, lines 13-16) 
Additionally, Merrill Gappmayer had already sworn under oath that he ha: 
no conversation( s) whatsoever with Garn, regarding what Fantasy Fruits was 
paying him for his cherries. In his answers to defendants• interrogatories, 
Merrill Gappmayer stated that he knew of 1lQ oral representation(s) or contra: 
made by the defendants Garn L. Baum or Peggy Baum or any party acting as tte: 
agent with him--Gappmayer, or any party acting as the plaintiffs' agent re~a:: 
the purchase, processing or marketing of sour cherries during 1973. (Reco!D' 
ll6, question No. 36 and answer) Merrill Gappmayer also answered "None" :o 
the question: "If such oral representation or contract as referred to in 
Interrogatory No. 36 was made; state: a. The location of such oral represen:;. 
of contract; b. The date of such; c. The identity of all persons presen' ciir 
6. 
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such; d. Your best recollection of all conversations relating to such oral 
representation or contract." Merrill Gappmayer' s answer to any and all of 
trese was "!:!£.ng.". (Record at 117, 4-part question No. 37 and answers) These 
answers sworn to nearly a year before trial, while his memory was much fresher, 
over:1helmingly contradict his story given at trial. And there is no chance 
that Merrill Gappmayer misunderstood these questions; he went to great lengths 
in his testimony at trial to show how well-infonned and intelligent he is. 
The 115 or more growers who sold cherries to the defendants and are not 
plaintiffs in this suit were mute testimony that the defendants paid the price 
at which they purchased the cherries, because the plaintiffs launched an active 
campaign--using Baum' s mailing list of growers--to get the growers to join this 
suit. The affidavits of 16 growers who sold cherries to the defendants, attest-
~g to the fact that the defendants quoted and paid 15 cents, added still more 
v.eight on the side of the defendants (Record at 178, 179 and 180), as did the 
testimony presented by seven grower-witnesses who verified the defendants quoted 
15 cents. These growers were Lawrence Smith (Record at 439, line 2); Hugh Park 
(Record at 511, lines 19-21 and lines 30 to 13 at 512); Max Roundy (Record at 
514, lines 22 to line 6 at 515); Kamel Kader (Record at 517, lines 21-23 and at 
518, lines 1-9); Terry Jenkins (Record at 557, lines 4-21); John Fowers and 
Jim Fowers (Record at 502, lines 8-9 and lines 26-30). Also, "Orem growers 
Cecil Ferguson and John Fowers said they were approached by Glade Gillman and 
asked if they wanted to sue. Both declined because Baum had paid them ~1hat he 
had quoted. Ferguson called the suit void and said, •Garn paid us what he told 
us and that was it.•" Another grower said, "l told Gillman that we were dealing 
with Banquet Foods and they paid 15 cents a pound; should we sue them too?" 
(Record at 183, lines 7-15 and 24-27) 
Also, it should not be a question of whether to believe Merrill Gappmayer, 
7. 
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Paul Hansen and Dean Gillman or Peggy and Garn Baum; but instead, whether to 
believe the affidavits of the growers and the testimony from the growers for 
the defense, and the better-than-100 growers who by their non-participation:· 
the suit agreed the price quoted and paid was 15 cents, or to believe the~:' 
three plaintiffs, one of which drastically changed his story and two of whk 
tried to take-over the Baum plant. The judge should have given more though: 
to this tremendous weight which was extremely supportive to defendants' posi: 
And where the Baums, over the twenty-odd years, had built up an enterprise,,, 
more than a million dollars, their testimony should have been more serious1·1 
considered, and their witnesses' testimony more seriously considered, insw: 
the judicial ear bent toward the five or six complainers, many of which were 
Gillrnans or related to the Gillmans, people which the judge knew had been 
involved in an attempted take-over of the Baum plant. Too, Judge Ballif, in 
his decision, said he chose to not believe Garn and Peggy because ~ said 
or that ••••• he gave no reason not to believe~· 
In any event, defendants point out that without a witness or witnesses·; 
any alleged oral contract or representation, the only thing Dean Gillman, Pi:: 
Hansen and Me=ill Gappmayer proved was that three people could get togethei 
and come up with a similar claim; such testimony without supportive proof is 
worthless and cannot stand up in Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 2 
Utah State law precludes enforcement of plaintiffs' alleged oral conti•r 
t for th~· According to the Utah State Statute Of Frauds, a contrac 
f bl by way of actj,QJ)Jl'. goods for the price of $500 or more is not en orceae _ 
· ac' 
· "t" suffi"ci"ent to indicate~ ~d~e~f~e~n~s~e~uun•l~e~s~s.....=t~hser~es_i~s_s~o~m~e~wr~i"-"'i~n~g'"'""'...='"""'·~~l.!.:=.~::.....:~==-
8. 
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I vle has been made between the parties and signed by the party against 
. ~enforcement is sought or by his authori~ed agent or broker. Emphasis added. 
:·See section 70A-2-201, Utah Code Annotated, Subsection ( 1). 
Evidence presented showed that each plaintiff sold cherries worth $500 
ormore to the defendants; also, plaintiffs produced~ written contract; thus 
: the alleged oral contract for better than 15 cents is not enforceable. 
ARGUMBff 
POINT 3 
Evidence did not establish at what price Muir-Roberts sold its cherries. 
Plaintiffs did not present to the Court by way of testimony or document 
the price at which Muir-Roberts sold its cherries. Plaintiffs' attorneys base 
·4their assertion of a 35 cent price, on what Garn L. Baum said in his testimony. 
',1ell, let's examine what Garn L. Baum said in answer to plaintiffs' attorney's 
;.question "Do you know the price at which Muir-Roberts sold theix cherries?" 
:He said this: "I think it was 35 cents. I think they all got 35 cents. If 
they kept them beyond when the ceiling was lifted, they could have gotten 
l:§..cent~. I don't know what they got on theix books. I don't !snow what they 
SU·" Emphasis added. (Record at 553, lines 7 and 11-15) 
Gaxn L. Baum did not know at what price Muir-Roberts sold its cherries. 
P~ had no way of knowing this. Plaintiffs' attorneys knew that defendant Baum 
had said he didn't know, yet they grabbed onto this figure and presented it as 
·the true price at which Muir-Roberts had sold, to confuse the Court. Where 
:Muir-Roberts did not settle with its growers until March 22, 1974 (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit No. 15), it is much more likely that Muir-Roberts held its cherries and 
didn't 1 · f se 1 them until late in 1973 or early 1974, well after the price ree~e 
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was lifted and the price had risen to 45 cents or more. (R ecord at 47~, 
lines 12-16) Trial Judge Ballif said: "They may have sold i· n J anuary, l'lell 
after the price freeze was lifted, and the price may have gone 
up to sixty 
cents (.60¢) then, and they may have been settling with all the people on 
the basis of a much higher price than what Mr. Baum got when he sold for 
thirty-five cents ( .35¢) ." (Record at 582 beginning at line 25) It is the 
contention of defendants Baum that Muir-Roberts did sell its cherries after 
the price had risen to 45 cents. 
Letter of July 10, 1973 was to give growers an idea of what the grower price 
would be 10 days from then when defendants would begin purchasing their ched 
I 
On July 10, 1973 a price freeze was in effect. The price freeze placed'! 
I 
ceiling on what the processed cherries could be marketed for. (Defendants Li 
not sell ~ cherries.) On July 10th there was talk and speculation ti.it thl' 
price freeze might be lifted. On July 10th the defendants expected the sOUJ 
cherry harvest would begin in about 10 days, because the sweet cherries tha: 
came right ahead of them were scheduled to begin on July 16th. 
Defendants needed to purchase cherries to run through their plant, so 
they decided to write a letter to the growers and let them know the Baum pl• 
would be open for business. Defendants wanted to quote them a firm price, ir 
the letter, but, because no one yet knew how long the price freeze would Ias:, 
defendants did the next best thing: they gave the growers an idea of what··'' 
,) 
d b · purchasi· grower price would be 10 days from then when defendants woul egin · 
their cherries, by telling them what the price was in Michigan right then· 
o,. anr 
defendants added that "If locked in prices are lifted from the process - · 
10. 
··' 
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·'ler the grower prices could go up substantially." 
reSc1.1. ' 
On July 10, 1973 it was not known for certain that should the price freeze 
ti; lifted the grower price YlQ.Uls! go higher; defendants thought that it could. 
Deiendants did not say in their letter that the grower prices will go up; they 
told tne growers they could. On July 10th they didn't know for sure--should 
the price freeze be lifted--if the price at which they could sell the processed 
cherries, that July, would indeed be higher, inasmuch as processors were always 
scrambling to sell their cherries at pack-time. 
Be that as it may, this letter was to indicate what the defendants' grower 
price was expected to be when they opened up for business on July 20th. That 
was when the defendants would purcJ1~ the growers' cherries ••• the letter was 
very clear that these cherries would be purchased, not consigned like the cherries 
:Muir-Roberts would receive. And in order to buy something, one has to have a 
:price. And when that something is cherriesi the buyer has to have a grower price. 
It gives the growers something to consider. 
A cash-buyer dealer can• t wait until next year to have a price; he has to 
have a price right at the time he is buying them, so that he can determine his 
costs and sell the processed cherries. He has to get the cherries sold in the 
SllI!ner so he can get the returns from the pie companies--who buy them, in time 
to pay the growers by late fall. Time will not permit him to wait and see what 
his competitor pays eight months later. He ~ study what the other cash-buyer 
is offering at the same time, however; and in 1973 it was 15 cents on a 95 score. 
(Record at 498, lines 11-21) 
On July 20th, 1973 the growers could either consign their cherries to 
Muir-Roberts and take whatever Muir-Roberts could get for them minus Muir-Roberts' 
costs · h' h and commission, or they could sell to the defendants at a set price w ic 
waq5 
cents per pound on a 95 score or better• (Record at 234, lines 4 and 5 of 
11. 
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next to last paragraph) With the defendants, the price was a sure 15 cen~;:. 
with Muir-Roberts it was a gamble, "a walk in the dark" (to quote gro~ Joi: 1 
Fowers); but, at the same time, there was the chance with Muir-Roberts tha: 
price would be more. There was also the chance it could be less .•. 
Where no one could foretell the duration of the price freeze, which ·.ns t 
ordered again on July 18, 1973 to remain in effect for another period of th! 
it wasn't known how long a processor would have to hold his processed cheni; 
if he were intent upon keeping them until the price freeze was over. A pro~: 
or speculating on the market might keep them a long, long time. And, in tir!.' 
the freezing and handling costs could eat away any price gains of a few cen:• 
per pound. 
It is so easy to look at something, like the price of cherries, in ret:!· 
spect, and see how the price freeze was lifted near sunmer' s end and how tf.e 
market climbed from 35 cents to 45 cents and more; but during July 1973, no;, 
could say what the processed cherries might bring somewhere down the road ir.' 1 
time, and no one could predict when the price freeze would be lifted. 
Defendants offered 15 cents a pound to anyone who wanted to sell ~1eir 
I 
cherries to them; no price was being offered, then, that was any higher. I: 
,C 
wasn • t a one on one deal where defendants sat down with each grower and i,Mii: 
d 
ually contracted their cherries; M.ui~-Rob~rts contracted cherries, but the 
defendants simply quoted the price at which they were buyi11g cherries, and 
!P 
any and all growers who cared to sell their cherries to them at that price 
could do so just by bringing their cherries in. 
I 
If the growers chose to sell to the defendants at a set price, and the" f 
1 • d th growers couldn • t come back and say they Muir-Roberts ater pai more, e a 
h Coul~ h · th t year·, t ey · wanted more money just because they made a wrong c oice a E 
have it both ways. They could either go the sure way with the defendants,:: 
12. 
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;hey could go with Muir-Roberts and gamble on receiving a higher price, quite 
e time later, even into the following year. i: SOll 
If Muir-Roberts had kept the cherries until the end of 1973 and the price 
freeze hadn't lifted, it would have had to sell at 35 cents or less and would 
s have had several months storage to deduct from the sales before paying the 
., growers, and therefore the growers would have received illi_than 15 cents. 
The July 10th letter was nothing more than an indication, as far as the 
... sour cherries were concerned, of what the defendants' price for the season 
'· 
1!. IOU)d be• 
'.'lhat defendants' profits were from 1973 sour cherry operation. 
Plaintiffs' attorneys would have the Court believe that defendants made 
r.;an astronomical profit on the 1973 sour cherry operation. This was not so. 
To support this, defendants bring to the Court's attention the figures given 
wthe attorneys, by the defendants, in defendants' answers to Plaintiff's 
: lntenogatories, which showed at what price defendants sold the processed 
11;cherries, their costs and their profits. Selling at 35 cents per pound, the 
deiendants• net profit per pound was 8 cents. Salaries or management were not 
figured in these costs. Based on the m.nnber of pounds sold--1,350,000, the 
!P!Ofit was $108,000. (Record at 148 and 149) which, for the si~e of the oper-
ation and the amount of the investment and the on-again off-again feast or 
"famine nature of fruit, was not excessive. Other incomes for the year came 
fromi f · nventory and other operations, etc.; defendants also handled other ruits, 
1i illd because of a loss-carry forward, the net income was $16,000. (Plaintiffs' 
:: Exhibit No, 16) 
13. 
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At any rate, what defendants• profit was is immaterial since h t ey pu 
chased the cherries at a firm price and paid it. And defendants add that 
Marsl}<l.J..Ly.__Earkes, 5 Cal. Rptr. 657, it was held that a complaint based 
an express oral contract will not sustain a recovery on theory of unjust 
ment. 
Evidence did not establish Muir-Roberts• price was 21t cents. 
The evidence showed that Muir-Roberts paid ~ prices: 2lt cents on 
97 score or better, and .!.Q_cents. Muir-Roberts paid Reed Pettingill 10 c1 
per pound for his A grade cherries, which means they were tops. Reed Pet 
testimony regarding the 10 cent price he received from Muir-Roberts~ 
missing when the transcript was transcribed by court reporter Myron Fra:zi1 
and the tape which recorded Pettingill' s testimony regarding the 10 cent 1 
is garbled at the point where Pettingill made the all-important statement 
ever, Reed Pettingill declared in his affidavit that he did indeed make U 
"10 cent" statement. (This affidavit is on page 13 of Defendants-Appellai 
Brief filed in this case on February 13, 1981 by attorney Robert Macri.) 
This 10 cent price that Muir-Roberts paid Reed Pettingill strongly 
contradicts that the price Muir-Roberts paid was 2lt cents. This testimOr 
by Pettingill should in all fairness not be disregarded. The section of 1 
referred to, should be listened to for the Court's determination. 
In the instant that the Court will not consider this 10 cent price i·ff 
was egregiously omitted from the transcript, then a price of 15 cents on< 
Sl.·nce Reed Petti'ngill also testi pack out must be considered in its stead, 
fl.. fteen cents and that ;,\uir-Roberts was that Muir-Roberts guaranteed them 
14. 
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-'ee on a pack out. Pettingill testified that a pack out meant "they will l· .n .. , 
. ' "you after your cherries run through the pi tter and everything, and they 
li1·Pa1 
· a'' you on what comes uw p) out of the machines." (Record at 497, lines 23-30 and 
ere. 
at 498, lines 1-8) 
Defendants did not pay on a pack out which meant that the growers were 
paid for less weight than what they brought in; defendant~ig__£n the actual 
~~hey received from the growers. 
ARGLMENT 
Evidence did not show Muir-Roberts' price was the fair market price. 
Defendants agree with plaintiffs regarding the three authorities listed 
!] i rel~.v which they cited in one of their filings in an effort to define what a 
,, ; faix market price is: 
••II 
,d !. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th edi tio11 says a fai;_market value is the 
, 1,:Hice at which a willing s_eller and a willing__Quyer wiJ..l...irad~." Emphasis 
added. 
m 2. Webst_e~s definition of fair market value is the same as just quoted. 
Fifteen cents was the price at which over 100 growers and the defendants 
v.ue willing to trade, and did trade; thus the fair market value or fair market 
price was clearly established at 1.2._~e.llll• 
3anquet Foods, also known as Western Pack, (Record at 496, lines 25-.26) 
another of the defendants• competitors and one that was also a cash buyer and 
.,.1deaJer like the ll• defendants, was also purchasing sour cherries at 15 cents. 
' (Record at 498' lines 15-21 and at 183, lines 24-27) The willing growers who 
·· sotd thei'r h · d f th o fi· ;:' c erries at 15 cents to the willing Banquet Foo s ur er c n rm 
·c.e 15 cent f · 
'" air market price. 
15. 
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3. The Court in !J.tah Assets Corp. v. Doolgy Brothers Associatio --=:.=-"'-'"""-"'-'C!2'~~-Q, 70 
P.2d 738 (Utah 1937) said: 
"Market value is frequently used, where a definite market 1 va ue can ce ei 
fixed, as a standard of value •••• An opi·ni·on of ark t 1 t m e va ue mus necessarL, ~ 
be intended to fix the value at which the property ought to give a fai: ~:. 
if sold to someone who is willing to purchase under ordinary selling condi~~tl 
In this case 15 cents per pound was the fair market value of the cher.: 
Banquet Foods was willing to purchase cherries at 15 cents, not 21~, butt 
~· Therefore, the defendants' price of 15 cents clearly confonned 1-tlt'. 
the standard of value. 
A 21 t cent price is out of line with the fair market price; so is the 
10 cent price to which Reed Pettingill testified. 
The fact that Muir-Roberts was licensed under Sec. 5-1-2 (e), U.C.A. :: 
as a "Corrunission merchant" whereas Mr. Farley and Fantasy Fruits were liw,, 
under subdivision ( g) of that same section as a "dealer", and in fact conic 
their buying operations differently, does indeed foreclose the trial court':fSll 
finding that 21t cents per pound was the fair market price. Where Muir·Ro~lth 
was a conunission merchant, it could take the cherries on consignment v.ithi:~ 
quoting a price and without determining a price until months later after i:~5 
sold the cherries. In fact, it had to sell the cherries before it coulj COlTh 
up with a price, because that is the way a corrunission merchant operates. 
see what they finally sell the cherries for, then deduct their costs and co:85 
Because of the method a colllllis::~ 
I 
l ' J~I ~ 
merchant uses, Muir-Roberts was not soliciting cherries at 212 cents in -' 
ission and pay the balance to the growers. 
Cents. • .Muir-Robed~ when defendants and Banquet Foods were purchasing at 15 I~' 
21t cent price was not established until the following March 1974; the~ 
price at which cherries were being solicited was 15 cents--quoted by :he .:i 
16. 
.. 
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70 dan:s, Banquet Foods, and--according to Reed Pettingill--Muir-Roberts; thus 
15 cents was the going price or fair market price. That Muir-Roberts--some 
1 ce ei0ht months later--paid more than the July 1973 market price, does not alter 
~i:, v.l1a'. ~he market price at that time of purchase actually was. 
: ~:. As to the price of 20 cents said to have been paid by Payson Fruit Growers, 
idi~:the defendants call the following to the attention of the Court: 
ier.:. Payson Fruit Growers is a cooperative that in 1973 was not 
: 1: soliciting cherries from outside their association of mem-
rit·. bers, and only took on additional cherries to help take up 
the slack because of the tremendous crop, and testimony by 
:he Don Christiansen was that Payson Fruit Growers had its own 
limitations and processed all their own cherries first. (Record 
1. :· at 402, lines 6-8, 15-16, and 30) And these additional 
.w., cherries were taken on at the end of the regular run. 
mic There was no evidence presented that any plaintiffs' cherries were 
1rt':f50licited by Payson Fruit Growers at 20 cents. There was no evidence of when 
·Ro~lthe 20 cent price was established. Also, it doesn't matter what their 
:hi:~sts r1ere or at what price they sold their cherries; being a cooperative it 
:i:~sinadifferent ballgame. It's like comparing a potato to a head of lettuce. 
1 C(l:!The tv.o processors just can• t be compared. 
Plaintiffs Billings and Harley Gillman were paid the fair market price, 
I ca:85 were all the other plaintif..f§. and all the other growers. But the fact 
iis:Jenains that this is irranaterial because the defendants bought the cherries 
I 
J~!·~ all the growers--plaintiffs included--at 15 cents. There was only one 
~r;~ice quoted and one price paid, and that was 15 cents. There was no evidence 
!!!t ~Oduced to 12.rove to the contrary. 
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ARQLMENT 
.J:_OI!J.T ~ 
Evidence did not show price freeze was lifted July 18, 1973. 
On June 13, 1973 President Nixon ordered a freeze for a maximum perieti 
60 days on the prices of all corranodi ties and services for sale except the 
prices charged for raw agricultural products. That Executive Order was 
No. 11723. Then on July 18, 1973, came the Executive Order No. 11730, wri: 
stated that: "The price freeze established by Executive Order 11723 rernak 
in effect until 11:59 p.m., e.s.t., August 12, 1973 •••• " (See Executi~e__\r. 
!iO· 11730, ':le~Compilation of Presidential Docu_mentLVol 9 July-Dec 191', 
page 912, Secti.Q11_jJ. 
Such price controls, ordered in a series of phases, did not end until 
September 12, 1973. Defendants sold their processed fruit before the pri~ 
freeze was lifted. 
For the purpose of clarification, the defendants state here that the; 
did not tell the growers that the grower price was frozen at 15 cents. Tie 
effect the price freeze had on the~ cherries was this: 
With a ceiling on the price at which the processed cherries couli 
marketed, the price to the grower was likewise restricted; in other'' 
since the price at which the defendants could sell their processed f~ 
pack was held down, so was the price at which the defendants woul~ re 
willing to purchase the cherries. 
ARGUMENT 
. -~: ~lfil:Jll must fail; no evidence was presented to prove the allegations·" 
18. 
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f 
under the First Count, defendants point out contradictions to plaintiffs' 
allegations, as follows: 
3. Plaintiffs did not deliver cherries in June to defendants. (See 
• Plaintiffs• Exhibit No. 2) 
4, Defendants did not operate as a commission merchant. Fact proved. 
5, Defendants were not required by law to make any accounting whatsoever 
as provided in Title 5, Chp. 1, Sections 18 and 19, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
since this applies to commission merchants. 
6. Defendants did !lQ1 charge plaintiffs excessive commission and charges; 
defendants charged plaintiffs no commission or charges at all. 
Under the Second Count, defendants contradict allegations therein as 
follows: 
!. First Count failed. 
2. Defendants did not agree or contract with the plaintiffs to pay the 
lilllOunts which were being paid by the other processors to producers of tart 
'cherries within the area. Defendants, throughout the entire picking-processing 
!season, did no more than offer to purchase sour cherries at 15 cents to anyone 
~v.ho had cherries for sale. 
3. Plaintiffs' allegation or claim that they relied upon the statements 
and past practices of the defendants when they delivered the tart cherries to 
the defendants, is supportively weak and would hold about as much water as a 
,~ingle·ply tissue-bottomed bucket. To ~ means to have confidence or trust; 
therefore what number 3 of the Second Count means is that the plaintiffs--
liecause of favorable past practices of the defendants--had confidence and trust 
:'1n the defendants that the defendants would pay them the 15 cents as quoted. 
Too the , 
' Y re saying that because of the confidence and trust there was no 
19. 
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written contract(s) between the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
The Complaint fails on both counts, as outlined above,· and k awove all, 
because there was no written contract. 
More on the context of the case. 
Here, defendants must make mention of certain conditions and/or happenr: 
they feel have adversely affected the fairness toward them in this case. ft 
the missing portion of Reed Pettingill' s crucial testimony. The defendants 
heard Pettingill make the statement, and the defendants reported the incom• 
transcription to Richard V. Peay, State of Utah, Office of the Court Adminis: 
tor, Salt Lake City. The court reporter denied any mistake or wrong doing,, 
he was not made to correct the omission. That was atrociously unfair. Dei~· 
dants believe an act of this type--omitting testimony from a transcript--sno: 
not be tolerated and could be criminal, and further believe the Court Syst~ 
should not be made a mockery of. 
Secondly, Dave McMullin has made gifts of various kinds of fruit, froo: 
farm, to the Trial Judge George E. Ballif, on many, many occasions, and theii 
acts, alone--which show they' re friends or he wouldn't accept the fruit··cau.~ 
the judge to be prejudiced, and the judge should have disqualified himself ::r 
the case, even though the defendants did not have this information at the •b 
so didn't ask for his disqualification. 
Thirdly, the plaintiffs' attorneys had and have an interest in this ca'' 
Y J and Dave Md'ud beyond that of representing the plaintiffs. Dallas oung r. 
. d Genola:: 
partners in the partnership "South Shores"--a huge West Mountain an 
h 1 gest in operation with 430 acres of fruit orchards purported to be t e ar 
20. 
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sta:e, and Dave r.1cMullin owner of another 350 acres planted in fruit, have 
encouraged growers to join the suit and have willingly represented the plain-
•ifis in this action because they wanted to rid themselves of a competitor in 
•0 .. e cherry processing business·•, competitor in the selling market. 
It was nothing short of brazen behavior on the part of these attorneys, 
/.ldMlin and Young when they named the lawsuit after Percy Adams, a man and 
grower who had not asked to be made a part of it, nor had he given them any 
ir: authority to put him in it, and it made a fool out of Percy Adams when he 
t didn't find out he was named in it until he read about it in the paper. 
For these attorneys to enter a corporation and individuals in a lawsuit, 
,, vtlthout authority from these parties, to do so, is unheard of and horrendously 
s: unfair not only to the corporation and the unknowing farmers, but also just as 
, unfair, if QOt more so, to the defendants. And for the attorneys to use these 
~· unsuspecting growers and corporation to further their own selfish gain is even 
o; more despicable. 
To show just how brazen these two attorneys were, imagine putting a corp-
oration, owned by the L.D. S. Church, in a lawsuit, without any authority. May the 
: defendants say again that Harold Boyer said the Elberta Farm C-;:!""oration never 
;: authorized the ·act of being named as plaintiff and that its inclusion as a 
u.~party plaintiff was contrary to the corporation's intent and desire. Mc Mullin, 
::1 a co-conspirator in the anti-trust case already mentioned, and Young put the 
b corporation in because of the Church• s powerful influence, the defendants contend, 
~d the defendants ask that the Court take a serious look at what they did,here. 
,, Defendants Baum went to the Utah State Bar regarding this matter, but the 
I Bar d'd t::: 1 no reprimanding. Defendants believe that any attorneys who do this sort 
:: of thing should be restrained from such behavior. 
'lso, ' 0 more fully see the picture why the plaintiffs brought the suit, 
21. 
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the defendants refer the Court to the Reco_r.Q. at 183..__tlnes 16~~. where 
plaintiff Glade Gillman makes the statement about Garn L. B "I aurn: .'le' re gore: 
sue that S.0.B., close him out, and take over his plant." 
The Gillmans and others, all cousins or brothers, wanted Baum• 5 place. 
In 1973 when they thought they had it, they didn't get it, and when John 
Gillman an officer in the Dept. of Agriculture saw Baum• s financial statl!il!' 
for the year ending 1973--when Baum applied for his 1974 license--and sal'I :: 
Baum made money, John Gillman was incensed with anger because he thought i-
should have been he who made that money instead of Baum, and this man Jot~ 
Gillman felt it ~uld have been he if Stan Farley hadn't foiled the Gillman;' 
takeover. John Gillman said Baum made too much money. 
In 1974 the Gillmans and a few others still wanted Baum' s place, and :;I 
sought to put him out of business. At the end of 1974 they filed this suit' 
and used it as an instrument of excuse to get the Dept. of Agriculture to 
raise Baum•s bond up to $100,000 again for the 1975 season. John Gillman~'' 
caused it to be raised to $100 ,OOO--higher than any other processor' s--in :·: 
spring of 1974, and Peggy Baum had gotten it lowered to $50,000, which ileo 
John Gillman. 
The Gillmans were the big movers regarding the suit. Gillman Brotheis, 
alone, financed it. McMullin was the natural attorney for the Gillmans to' 
to file the suit, because he was already John Gillman•s attorney. Bothlor"1 
and McMullin being growers of large acreages of fruit and both serving on~' 
boards shared cormnon interests. 
The paying of 21t cents by Muir-Roberts, also a defendant party in the 
· ld di· ssatisfaction among anti-trust case, was the cheapest way it cou cause 
imitc 
Baum• s growers and help to destroy Baum' s business, and get rid of then 
one cherry processor in the state. 
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ooOoo 
It is clear that the plaintiffs did not establish any proof as to their 
allegations, and the burden of proof rested on their shoulders. There were 
no witnesses of any kind to any alleged oral representation(s) and there 
was no written contract. Where the cherries were worth $500 or more, per 
each plaintiff, the alleged oral contract for a price better than 15 cents 
cannot be enforced. 
It is clear, as well, that 15 cents was the price at which cherries 
~re being traded between growers and processors in July 1973 when defendants 
!purchased plaintiffs' cherries; thus 15 cents was the fair market price. 
Plaintiffs all received 15 cents--the fair market price. Muir-Roberts held 
its cherries and sold at much greater prices than the defendants, and paid 
',some of its growers more than 15cents, but this did not alter the fair market 
price of 15 cents, as Muir-Roberts was not soliciting cherries at 21t cents 
when defendants and Banquet Foods were making their purchases at 15 cents. 
Muir-Roberts' 21~ cent price was not established until March 22, 1974, eight 
IOOnths after defendants made their purchases. 
Al.so, it is the contention of these defendants that this lawsuit was 
filed not to collect additional monies but for the purpose of trying to put 
'B 
awn out of business. Too, the plaintiffs' Complaint, when examined closely, 
was found to be but a mere dry-boned skeleton without a fragment of meat. 
Because of the foregoing points and supportive cited authorities and 
statutes, defendants• Petition for R_ehearing should be granted, or in the 
alcernative the Court• s June 24, 1982 ruling s!lo_ul.d~tomatically reve~sed 
23. 
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in favor of the defendants, in light of the Utah State Statute Of Frauds :rer 
-::.:. 
provides thaj:_Lcontract for: the sale of goods worth $500 or_ more must be,, 
--- -~
writing to be enforceable. 
Dated this 28th day of July 1982. 
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'd_ TABI,_E_OF AUT!iQRITIE~ 
CASES 
~id v. tJortQfu. 596 P.2d ll08. ','luo. 1979 
~shall v..__farkes, 5 Cal. Rptr. 657 
Utah Assets Corp. v. Doq_ley Brothers Association, 70 P.2d 738 (Utah 1937) 
~TATUTES 
- 5-1-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, subdivisions (e) and (g) 
ZQ&:2=.201Jltfill__Code Annq_tated, Subsection ( 1) 
) Title 5, Chp 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sections 18 and 19 
~ 
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition 
':lebster' s Dictionary 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
June 13, 1973 Order No. 11723 and July 18, 1973 Order No. 11730, Weekly Compil-
ation of Presidential Documents Vol 9 July-Dec 1973, page 912, Section 1 
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I hereby certify that I r.iailed tv10 copies of the foregoing Grier of 
Defendants-Appellants Garn L. and Peggy Baum to Dallas 1-:. 'foung, Jr. and 
Dave Ucnullin, Attorneys for plain ti ff s, at their address: Ivie and Young, 
48 North University Avenue, Provo, Utah 24601, and hand-delivered two copie 
to Roberi: !J. L\acri, 738 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, on this 
28th day of July 1982. 
26. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
